World at Risk : The New Task of Critical Theory by Beck, Ulrich
WORLD AT RISK: THE NEW TASK OF CRITICAL THEORY*1
ULRICH BECK
Munich University and LSE
In the current phase of reflexive or second modernization, we are witnessing a dialectics 
of modernity: continuity of the principles and discontinuity of basic institutions of 
nation-state modernity. This process is leading us from the national industrial society 
to the world risk society. A theory of reflexive modernization consists of theorems of 
individualization, cosmopolitanization, and risk society. This radicalized modernity has 
produced world risk society. What signifies the risk society are manufactured 
uncertainties which tend to be intangible to our senses. The theory of world risk society 
as a new Critical Theory assumes three characteristics of global risks: delocalization, 
uncalculability, and non- compensatability. This theory also adopts eight theses 
regarding the inequality of global risks; the power of risk definition; risk and 
culture/trust; cosmopolitian politics of world risk society; a 'revolutionary subject' for 
climate change; global risks empowering states and civil movements; divergent 
(environmental/ economic/ terrorist) logics of global risks; world risk society as a 
boundary-transcending process. The "cosmopolitan moment" of world risk society is 
now set free. 
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In 1861 during the birth pangs of modern society Charles Baudelaire wrote 
in the foreword to Les Fleurs du Mal: ‘Paris is the centre and splendour of 
universal stupidity. Who would ever have believed that France would 
pursue the path of progress with such verve?’
What Baudelaire calls ‘universal stupidity’ is nothing other than 
modernity’s belief in itself, in its unstoppable victory march: argument 
triumphs over superstition and belief, the human being becomes the 
measure of all things and, by continually extending the boundless plasticity 
of modern technology, everything accidental can be cast off. Historically 
speaking, this ceaseless change appears as a transition from darkness into 
light, as an implicit theory of the process of moral evolution which we call 
‘progress’. Science, which displaces God and religion from the centre, 
operates with a ‘mythology’ of its own that captures the old distinction 
between the sacred and the profane as a distinction between lay opinion and 
expert rationality, and this becomes the source of secular-religious visions of 
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deliverance. One question arises among many others: Can we imagine a 
power capable of shattering these idols of modern capitalist society? 
The counter-actors and counter-visions heralded by the self- 
empowerment of modernity have been subsequently dethroned ― the 
proletariat, communism, socialism, nationalism, the new intelligentsia or the 
mute force of public argument. They have not withstood the test of history, 
as the twentieth century shows. If there is any countervailing force that could 
transform this immanent metaphysics of modernity then, I would argue, it is 
the power of modernity itself.
Modern society’s belief in linear modernization contradicts the 
self-disenchantment of modernity, its ability to epochal change, to 
self-transformation. Contrary to the social theories of Comte, Marx, 
Durkheim and Weber, through Horkheimer, Adorno, Parsons and 
Bourdieu, up to Foucault, Luhmann and Habermas, I maintain that the 
apparently independent and autonomous system of industrialism has 
transgressed its logic and boundaries and has thereby begun a process of 
self-dissolution. We are witnessing a dialectics of modernity: continuity of the 
principles and discontinuity of basic institutions of nation-state modernity. 
This radical turn marks the current phase in which modernization is 
becoming reflexive. What we need in sociology are models of ‘discontinuous 
change’, of internal differentiation of modernity. Because modernization is 
now impinging upon the very social, political and cultural basic institutions 
of industrial society of nation-state, is breaking them down and is giving rise 
to new potentials in opposition to industrial modernity; that is, for 
environmental sub- and (authoritarian) state-politics; emerging cultures and 
movements of participation; a profound critique not only of neoliberal 
capitalism, but also of the hierarchically organizing practices of the 
traditional left; and ― last but not least ― a New Critical Theory. In this way, 
the process of reflexive modernization is leading from the national industrial 
society to the (still indeterminate ambiguity of) world risk society. 
GENERAL PERSPECTIVE: NOT POST-MODERNITY BUT SECOND 
MODERNITY
I reject the idea that this epochal shift is a move from the modern to the 
post-modern, as some argued two decades ago. For me these are all ‘modern’ 
capitalistic societies. Even more they are modern and more capitalistic. So 
there is not a moving beyond the modern to its opposite. But there is second 
modernity in the making.
This theory of reflexive or second modernity has, of course, to be 
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contextualized. One has to specify it in relation to historical conditions, i.e. 
different paths to modernity (self-transformation or colonialization, 
authoritarian state, expert system, cultural backgrounds, failed state, human 
rights and democracy, religious cultures etc). “South Korea or China, for 
example, has been transformed from a typically agrarian society into a 
highly differentiated industrial society within the period of just one generation. 
At the apex of this rush to development stands the bureaucratic 
authoritarian state which was at once productive and repressive: productive 
in the sense that the state was able to mobilize all the available resources to 
attain the national goal of development as quickly as possible (...) At the 
same time, the state ruthlessly controlled popular social movements through 
violent means, marginalizing the democratic institutions of representation 
and legal justice” (Han, 2006). 
Generally speaking, one can divide the theory of reflexive modernization 
into three complexes, namely, the theorem of forced individualization, the 
theorem of multi-dimensional globalization (cosmopolitanization), and the 
theorem of risk society. All three theorems extrapolate the same line of 
argumentation and thereby mutually interpret and reinforce each other: 
‘Individualization,’ ‘cosmopolitanization’ and ‘risk society’ are viewed as 
radicalized forms of a dynamic of modernization that, when applied to itself, 
annuls the formula of simple modernity and its specific logic. This logic of 
unequivocalness ― one could speak metaphorically of a Newtonian theory of 
society and politics of the first modernity ― is being replaced by a logic of 
ambiguity ― Heisenbergian principle of indeterminacy of the social and the 
political, of second modernity, so to speak. Of course, classical sociology is also 
familiar with crises and functional disruptions. But the notion that the 
foundations of modern society become porous or shaky, or must be recalibrated 
at the moment of their triumph, is alien to the classics of social science. 
Individualization
Individualization must be clearly distinguished from individualism. 
Whereas individualism is commonly understood as a personal attitude or 
preference, individualization refers to a macro-sociological phenomenon, 
which possibly ― but then again perhaps not ― results in changes in attitude 
in individuals. That is the crux of contingency ― how individuals deal with it 
remains an open question. I, like Zygmunt Bauman and Anthony Giddens, 
emphasize that individualization is misunderstood if it is seen as a process 
which derives from a conscious choice or preference on the part of the 
individual. The crucial idea is this: individualization really is imposed on the 
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individual by modern institutions. 
The instance of falsification (and with it also the empirical proof of the 
theorem of individualization) is not to be found primarily in the contingency 
of attitudes and modes of behavior of individuals (and in corresponding 
qualitative and quantitative studies), but in the field of law, thus in the 
relationship between state and individualization: basic civil rights, basic political 
rights, basic social rights, family law, divorce law, but also the neoliberal 
reforms of the labor market ― in all these fields there is an evident, 
empirically verifiable or refutable, and historic trend towards an 
institutionalized individualization. This is because the addressee of these 
(basic) rights and reforms is the individual and not the group, the collective. 
From this point of view, the historical-empirical basis for testing 
individualization theory, not only within a national society, but across 
borders, is: 
1) the establishment of basic civil and political rights in the 
nineteenth century Europe, their restriction (to men) and their 
de-restriction (inclusion of women) and, 
2) the establishment, expansion and then dismantling of the welfare 
state in Western Europe after the Second World War, and in particular 
the developments from the 1960s and 1970s onwards. 
Cosmopolitanization
The cosmopolitanization of reality is not the result of a cunning conspiracy 
on the part of ‘global capitalists’ or an ‘American play for world domination.’ 
The nation-state is increasingly besieged and permeated by a planetary 
network of interdependency, by ecological, economic and terrorist risks, 
which connect the separate worlds of developed and underdeveloped 
countries. To the extent that this historical situation is reflected in a global 
public sphere, a new historical reality rises, a cosmopolitan outlook in which 
people view themselves simultaneously as part of a threatened world and as 
part of their local situations and histories. The exposure to different risks and 
religious cultures gives them a particular understanding of a world in which 
violent division and unprecedented intermingling coexist, and anger and 
opportunity vie.
Risk society
Risk means, not catastrophe but anticipated catastrophe, potential danger. 
Risk society means: risk has come across the current stage of modernity. 
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I then distinguish between the industrial and the risk society, asserting 
that the transformation from the former to the latter began at the late 1960s. 
What signifies the risk society are manufactured uncertainties, that is a range of 
new risks ― for example, environmental problems ― which are unintended 
side effects of technological and economic development. These 
manufactured uncertainties result from scientific and technological 
progress, which supposedly should solve, not create problems.
Historically I describe two ways of movement: from danger to risk and 
from risk to danger as manufactured uncertainty. I define danger as caused 
by nature and risk as caused by humans: danger does not presume decision, 
risk presumes decision (and modernization). In radicalized modernity the 
new risks are hence manufactured or fabricated uncertainties and dangers, 
because the range of potential catastrophes and uncertainties grows with 
technological and scientific progress and more industrialization, more cars 
and more wealth also cause more environmental problems. Of course, there 
have been always side effects, but in first or simple modernity these side 
effects were immediately noticeable, the new risks tend to be intangible to 
our senses. Which means that they only can be known by means of scientific 
tests ― and they are often latent. Their latency is one reason why these new 
risks are not fully scientifically determinable, even though they are to a 
degree knowable through science. This means that the traditional 
technologies of risk assessment, management and insurance are no longer 
fully functional. The new risks are, in other words, manufactured 
uncertainties and dangers: modernity is faced with its own destructive 
potential of social and technological development without having adopted 
adequate answers. Again, it is not post-modernity but more modernity 
radicalized, which produces world risk society. 
WORLD RISK SOCIETY: A NEW CRITICAL THEORY
The theory of world risk society argues that the global anticipation of 
global dangers and catastrophes rock the foundations of modern societies. 
Such global risks exhibit three characteristic features:
1. Delocalization: their causes and consequences are not limited to one 
geographical location or space; they are in principle omnipresent.
2. Uncalculability: their consequences are in principle uncalculable; at 
bottom they involve ‘hypothetical’ risks based on scientifically generated 
non-knowing and normative dissent.
3. Non-compensatability: although the dream of security of the first 
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modernity did not exclude harms (even major harms), they were regarded 
as compensatable so that their destructive impacts could be made good 
(by money, etc). If climate change is irrevocable, if human genetics makes 
possible irreversible interventions in human existence, if terrorist groups 
already possess weapons of mass destruction, then it’s too late. Given this 
new quality of ‘threats to humanity,’ argues Franc̨ois Ewald (2002), the 
logic of compensation is breaking down and is being replaced by the 
principle of precaution through prevention. 
The delocalization of risks occurs on three levels: 
a) spatial: the new risks (e.g. climate change) are spreading over national 
borders, and even over continents;
b) temporal: the new risks have a long latency period (e.g. nuclear waste), 
so that their future effects cannot be reliably determined and restricted; 
moreover, knowledge and non-knowing are changing so that the question 
of who is affected is itself temporally open and remains disputed;
c) social: since the new risks are the result of complex processes 
involving long chains of effects, their causes and effects cannot be 
determined with sufficient precision (e.g. financial crises).
The uncalculability of risk is an implication of the overriding importance 
of the inability-to-know. At the same time, however, the claim to knowledge, 
control and security of the state had to be renewed, deepened and extended. 
This results in the irony of having to control something even though one does 
not know whether it exists. Why is this so? Because the priority to which 
modern society accords security is not annulled, but, on the contrary, is 
activated and dominated, by non-knowing (as is shown in particular by the 
terrorist risk). Manufactured uncertainties make society more reliant than 
ever on security and control. It may sound ironic, but it is precisely the 
unknown which provoke the major conflicts over the definition and 
construction of political rules and responsibilities ― with the aim of 
preventing the worst.
World risk society is confronted with the awkward problem of having to 
make decisions about life and death and war and peace on the basis of a more 
or less frank lack of knowledge. If we anticipate catastrophes whose 
destructive potential threatens everybody, then the risk calculation based on 
experience and rationality breaks down. Now all possible, to a greater or 
lesser degree improbable scenarios must be taken into consideration; to 
knowledge drawn from experience and science, we must add imagination, 
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suspicion, fiction and fear. 
Franc̨ois Ewald writes: 
“The precautionary principle requires an active use of doubt, in the 
sense Descartes made canonical in his Meditations. Before any action, I 
must not only ask myself what I need to know and what I need to master, 
but also what I do not know, what I dread or suspect. I must, out of 
precaution, imagine the worst possible, the consequence that an infinitely 
deceptive, malicious daemon could have slipped into an apparently 
innocent enterprise” (Ewald, 2002: 285).
Given their task of averting dangers, politicians, in particular, may easily 
find themselves compelled to proclaim that the observance of security 
standards is assured even though such guarantees are impossible. They do 
so nonetheless because the political costs of omission are much higher than 
those of an overreaction. It is not going to be easy in future, therefore, given 
the state’s promise of security and a mass media hungry for catastrophes, to 
prevent a diabolical power game with the hysteria of non-knowing. I have 
eight theses on the Critical Theory of World Risk Society.
The inequality of global risks
Risk and social inequality, indeed, risk and power are two sides of the 
same coin. Risk presumes a decision, therefore a decision-maker, and 
produces a radical asymmetry between those who take, define the risks and 
profit from them, and those who are assigned to them, who have to suffer the 
‘unforeseen side effects’ of the decisions of others, perhaps even pay for them 
with their lives, without having had the chance to be involved in the 
decision-making process. Where and for whom is the functionality, the 
attraction of the ‘globalization’ of risks? Here, too, a relationship between 
risk and power is evident. Often it is the case, that the danger is exported, 
either spatially ― to countries, whose elites see an opportunity for 
themselves ― or temporally ― into the future of unborn generations. 
The dismissal of risks in states, in which poverty and illiteracy are 
especially widespread, does not mean that these societies are not integrated 
into world risk society. In fact, it’s the other way round. Thanks to the scarce 
resource of silence, which they offer as their specific form of ‘wealth,’ they 
are the worst affected. There is a fatal attraction between poverty, social 
vulnerability, corruption, the accumulation of dangers, humiliation and the 
denial of dignity ― fast growing in the age of globality of information. The 
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poorest of the poor live in the blind spots which are the most dangerous 
death zones of world risk society. 
The power of risk definition
Who decides in a world of manufactured uncertainties in which 
knowledge and non-knowledge of risks are undissolvable, what is and what 
is not a risk? It is important for the Critical Theory of risk society that the 
concept of “relations of definition” is understood in a constructivist sense. 
What ‘relations of production’ in capitalist society represented for Karl Marx, 
‘relations of definition’ represent for risk society. Both concern relations of 
domination (Beck, 1995, 2002; Goldblatt, 1996). Among the relations of 
definition are the rules, institutions and capabilities which specify how risks 
are to be identified in particular contexts (for example, within nation-states, 
but also in relations between them). They form at the legal, epistemological 
and cultural power matrix in which risk politics is organized. Relations of 
definition power can accordingly be explored through four clusters of 
questions:
1. Who determines the hazardousness of products, dangers and risks? 
Where does the responsibility lie? With those who produce the risks, with 
those who benefit from them or those who are potentially or actually 
affected by the dangers in their lives and their social relations? What role 
do the different publics and their actors play in this context? And how can 
these questions be answered within national spaces, between national 
spaces and globally?
2. What kind of knowledge or non-knowledge of the causes, 
dimensions, actors, and so on, is involved? Who lays down the causal 
norms (or nomological correlations) which decide when a cause-effect 
relation is to be recognized? And who has the right to demand and get 
what information, and from whom?
3. What counts as ‘proof’ in a world where knowledge and 
non-knowledge of risks are inextricably fused and all knowledge is 
contested and probabilistic?
4. Who is to decide on compensation for the afflicted ― within one or 
several nation-states? How is the call for ‘precaution’ put into effect? To 
what extent should those most seriously affected by the ‘latent side effects’ 
be involved in working out corresponding regulations? 
Keeping these clusters of questions in mind, it becomes clear that risk 
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societies, in virtue of the historical logic of their national and international 
legal systems and scientific norms, are prisoners of a repertoire of behaviors 
that completely miss not only the globality of environmental crises but also 
the specificity of manufactured uncertainties. Thus these societies find 
themselves confronted with the institutionalized contradiction, according to 
which threats and catastrophes, at the very historical moment when they are 
becoming more dangerous, are more present in the mass media and hence 
more mundane, increasingly escape all established concepts, causal norms, 
assignments of burdens of proof and ascriptions of accountability. As long as 
these relations of definition ― ultimately with the aid of a critical theory of 
world risk society ― are not uncovered and politically transformed (a truly 
Herculean task), the world will continue its fruitless search for its lost 
security.
Risk and culture: the ‘symbolic code’ of 9/11
The mode of existence of risks does not consist in being real but in 
becoming real. Becoming real, the globally shared expectation of catastrophe, 
however, proceeds from the staged and globalized real experience of the 
catastrophe itself. How? Seldom has an image captured so clearly the instant 
of global transformation, the shock-birth of a global threat. One of the most 
massive structures erected by human beings collapsed within 14 seconds in 
a monstrous cloud of whirling and swirling dust ― a hundred-floor giant 
was transformed into a rising plume of white smoke. The end of the World 
Trade Centre gave Americans an idea of what it means to awaken suddenly 
in the strange new world risk society. On the fateful day, two airliners were 
detached from their socially defined context of use and ‘converted’ into 
weapons, partly into weapons of mass destruction, partly into weapons of 
symbolic destruction. 
’Staging’, the deliberate production of the real possibility of the global 
terrorist threat, captures and circumscribes this deconstructive and 
reconstructive real and symbolic destructive unity. This destructive force 
was directed at the Twin Towers of a materially constructed and 
simultaneously profoundly symbolically imbued social authority in a literal 
sense, namely, the World Trade Centre. The resulting fireball consumed 
everything around it, including thousands of human lives. It exploded 
everywhere, in every living room in the world. In the process, the deed 
destroyed deeply rooted cultural assumptions. The television images of the 
twin cathedrals of global capitalism collapsing suddenly in a giant cloud of 
dust exerted such a fascination because of their traumatic obscenity. The 
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belief in the invulnerability of the greatest military power on earth was 
executed before a live audience. The eruption transformed the site into a 
dark crater that swallowed up life, dignity, compassion and military 
security. 
These material and symbolic explosions brought forth something spatially 
and temporally removed from them, namely, the expectation of terrorism. 
They created the taken-for-granted belief that, however improbable it may 
seem, such a thing is really possible, which means that it can reoccur 
anywhere at any time. And because expectation is the medium and goal of 
staging, the boundary between justified concern and hysteria is becoming 
blurred.
Here the relationship between risk and trust becomes important. The 
expectation of catastrophes undermines trust, which is the key to a 
functioning relationship between a wider society and different expert 
systems (Giddens, 1990): the less trust, the more risk, the more manufactured 
uncertainties.
Politics of world risk society
Let’s ask: is there, for example, a political narrative for climate change 
politics? Yes, there could be. Climate change is not solely a matter of 
hurricanes, droughts, floods, refugee movements, impending wars or 
unprecedented market failure. It has suddenly become much more than that: 
for the first time in history, every population, culture, ethnic group, every 
religion and every region in the world is living in the common presence of a 
future that threatens one and all. In other words, if we want to survive, we 
have to include those who have been excluded. The politics of climate 
change is necessarily inclusive and global ― it is cosmopolitan realpolitik. 
National realpolitik is still dominant; but it is looking backwards, becoming 
ineffective! Most of all: cosmopolitan realpolitik is empowering national 
states!
There appear to be two radically different models of climate policy 
emerging. The one adheres to the formula ‘climate protection doesn’t hurt.’ 
The idea here is to try and lower greenhouse gas emissions in a consumer- 
and voter-friendly way by pursuing bold innovations in ecology and 
technology, in line with the old logic of progress. 
However, by keeping a seemingly realistic eye on the power of the 
powerful (the automotive corporations, for example) one runs the risk of 
overlooking the power of the powerless. Climate change forces us to realize 
that the only way of setting up effective checks is through fairness and 
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equality: only by taking account of the others ― the poor ― in our own 
decision-making can we ultimately protect ourselves effectively from the 
consequences of climate change. Thus cosmopolitan realpolitik is the politics 
of listening and the politics of global justice. 
Thus the other model is based on the realization that, when taken seriously 
and thought through to its logical conclusions, climate change entails a 
political paradigm shift. Only a broad-based coalition that includes ‘old 
Europeans,’ eco-conscious Americans, underdeveloped countries, 
developing countries, China, India, South Korea, civil society movements 
and powerful fractions of global capital can win back national sovereignty in 
a world risk society that is ecologically fragile and vulnerable to terrorist 
threats. It is not a matter of undermining, let alone abolishing nation-states. 
Rather, it is a matter of restoring to them the capacity to act effectively at all 
― i.e. together and in collaboration with one another. Thus cosmopolitan 
realpolitik is about empowering national societies and states.
Is there a ‘revolutionary subject’ for climate politics?
In an unexpected meaning, yes, there is. Risk ― I argued ― is not 
catastrophe. Risk means the anticipation of catastrophe. And the mediating 
and staging of this anticipation has a huge mobilizing force which 
fundamentally changes global politics. 
The virtuality of climate change does not mean it is untrue or 
inconsequential. Indeed, because as the case of the Australian elections at the 
end of last year has shown, the anticipated future catastrophe, which cannot 
be experienced in everyday life but has to be taken at face value on the basis 
of the strength of its mediation, shows the mobilizing power of hypothetical 
futures. Yet few of these individuals voting could have direct experience of 
the effects of climate change, all this knowledge is indirect, it comes from 
scientists, politicians, media, and the whole array of sub-politics. These 
sub-political forces are in essence not very strong and they were initially not 
well connected, they were marginal forces often ridiculed for their extreme 
views. And look at the world now, Al Gore received a Nobel Prize for his 
slide show on climate change. And it is not like he is such a powerful actor or 
that his allies are that powerful. Yet they managed to shape the political 
agenda on a global scale.
Global risks empower states and civil movements
The strategies of action disclosed by global risk are rudely overturning the 
order brought forth by the neoliberal coalition between capital and the state: 
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climate risks empower states and civic movements, because they reveal new 
sources of legitimation and options for action for these groups of actors; on 
the other hand, they disempower globalized capital because the consequences 
of investment decisions create climate risks, destabilize markets and activate 
the power of the sleeping consumer giant. Thus there is an alternative option 
for neoliberal politics both in the national and global arenas: to connect civil 
society with the state, and that means to bring about a cosmopolitan form of 
statehood (historic example: European Union). 
To put it more concretely, the state’s regained cosmopolitan scope for 
action extends its influence in the domestic and the foreign domains through 
action and governance in transnational networks to which other states ― but 
also NGOs, supranational institutions and transnational corporations ― 
belong. Thus the cosmopolitan state, freed from scruples concerning 
sovereignty, uses the cooperation of other governments, non-governmental 
organizations and globally operating corporations to solve ‘national’ 
problems.
Of course, this optimistic construction could easily collapse under its own 
weight. It is fragile because the costs and benefits of an active climate change 
policy are unequally distributed, both internationally and nationally, and 
because the burning question of justice in a radically unequal world is at the 
heart of the struggles of distribution. The costs will hit existing generations 
hardest whereas the benefits will fall to the grandchildren of our 
grandchildren. The wealthiest countries must demonstrate the greatest 
willingness to compromise even though they are not the most vulnerable to 
the impacts of global warming. In order to strike the required ‘global deal,’ 
the agreement of the United States is most urgently needed, even though it 
would have to pay China, its archrival, gigantic sums in order to make that 
country carbon dioxide-free ― at a point in history when this huge country is 
preparing to overtake the United States economically and to become a centre 
of world power. Here are reasons why cosmopolitan realpolitik, of course, is 
less attractive for superpowers, which believe in autonomy, and attractive 
for European powers, which believe in cooperation and interdependence. 
The consequences are evident: The crisis deepens, and so does the gap 
between words and capability.
Divergent logics of global risks: on the distinction between economic, environmental 
and terrorist risks
At least three axes of conflict in world risk society must be distinguished in 
the communicative logic of global risks: first, environmental risk conflicts, 
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which spontaneously generate a global dynamic; second, global financial 
risks, which are at first individualized and nationalized; and, third, the threat 
posed by terrorist networks, which are both empowered and disempowered by 
the states. In the case of environmental risks that pose physical threats, there 
is on the one side affluence-induced environmental destruction, as in the case 
of the hole in the ozone layer and the greenhouse effect, which may 
justifiably be laid primarily at the door of the Western industrial world, 
though their impact is, of course, global. From this we must distinguish 
poverty-induced environmental destruction, such as the clearing of the rain 
forest, which is mainly confined to particular regions though its scale is no 
less alarming.
Then there are the global economic risks, the imponderabilities of 
globalized currency and financial markets. As the ‘Asian Crisis’, the ‘Russian 
Crisis’ and the ‘Argentinean Crisis’ demonstrated, the middle classes are the 
worst hit by global or regional financial crises. Waves of bankruptcies and 
job losses shook the respective regions. Western investors and 
commentators viewed the ‘financial crises’ exclusively from the perspective 
of the possible threat they posed for the financial markets. However, global 
financial risks, like global ecological crises, cannot be confined to the 
economic subsystem but mutate into social upheavals and thus into political 
threats. In the case of the ‘Asian Crisis’, such a chain reaction destabilized 
whole states and led simultaneously to outbreaks of violence against 
minorities who were painted as scapegoats.
Even advocates of a global free market increasingly express openly the 
suspicion that, after the collapse of communism, only one opponent of the 
free market remains, namely, the unbridled free market which has shrugged 
off its responsibility for democracy and society and operates exclusively on 
the maxim of short-term profit-maximization. There are surprising parallels 
between the Chernobyl reactor catastrophe and the Asian financial crisis. 
The traditional methods of steering and control are proving to be inoperable 
and ineffectual in the face of global risks. The millions of unemployed and 
poor cannot be financially compensated; it makes no sense to insure against 
the impacts of a global recession. At the same time, the social and political 
explosiveness of global market risks is becoming palpable. Governments are 
being overthrown and civil wars are threatening to break out. As those risks 
come to public awareness, the question concerning responsibility becomes 
loud. This dynamic leads to an inversion of neoliberal policy ― not the 
economization of politics, but the politicization of the economy.
”Serious consideration should be given to establishing an Economic 
Security Council within the United Nations....There are many issues, 
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including governance of currency markets and responding to ecological 
risks that cannot be resolved without collective action involving many 
countries and groups. Not even the most liberalized national economy 
works without macroeconomic coordination; it makes no sense to suppose 
that the world economy is different”(Giddens, 1998: 176).
To be sure, economic crises areas old as the markets themselves. And, since 
the global economic crisis of 1929 at the latest, it has been clear to everyone 
that financial crashes can have catastrophic effects ― especially for politics. 
The Bretton Woods institutions established following World War II were 
conceived as global political answers to global economic risks, and the fact 
that they functioned was a key factor in the emergence of the European 
welfare state. Since the 1970s, however, those institutions have been largely 
dismantled and replaced by a succession of ad hoc solutions. Thus we face 
the paradoxical situation that, whereas markets have never been more liberal 
and more global, the powers of the global institutions that monitor their 
effects have been drastically curtailed. Under these conditions, we cannot 
rule out the possibility of a worldwide financial disaster on the scale of 1929.
In contrast to environmental and technological risks, whose physical 
effects first win social relevance ‘from outside,’ financial risks also affect an 
immediately social structure, namely, the economy or, more precisely, the 
guarantee of solvency which is indispensable to its normal functioning. This 
means, first, that the impact of financial risks is also much more strongly 
mediated by other social structures than the impact of global environmental 
risks. Hence, financial risks can be more easily ‘individualized’ and 
‘nationalized’ and they give rise to major differences in perceptions of risk. 
Finally, global financial risks ― not least in their worldwide (statistical) 
perception ― are attributed as national risks to particular countries or regions. 
Of course, this by no means implies that economic interdependence risks are 
any less risky. Since all of the subsystems of modern society rely on the other 
subsystems, a failure of the financial system would be catastrophic. No other 
functional system plays such a prominent role in the modern world as the 
economy. Thus, the world economy is without doubt a central source of risk 
in the world risk society. 
The threat posed by global terrorist networks, by contrast, is a completely 
different matter. As we have seen, environmental and economic conflicts can 
be understood as side effects of radicalized modernization. Terrorist 
activities, by contrast, must be understood as deliberate, intentional 
catastrophes. They deliberately exploit the manifest vulnerability of modern 
civil society and replace the principle of chance and accident. The concept of 
an accident, which is based on the calculation of the probability of cases of 
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loss, is no longer applicable. Terrorists need only target so-called residual 
risks and the civil consciousness of a highly complex and interdependent 
world to globalize the ‘felt violence’ which paralyzes modern society and 
causes it literally to freeze with panic. Correspondingly, the terrorist risk 
leads to an extreme expansion of the domain of ‘dual use goods’ that serve 
both civil and military purposes. 
Transnational terrorism differs from national terror in that it neither 
pursues national goals nor depends primarily or exclusively on national 
actors within nation-states. Thus ‘transnational’ means multinational 
terrorist networks with the potential to attack ‘the West’ and ‘modern 
society’ anywhere. What is striking is that and how the global anticipation of 
terrorist attacks is ultimately ‘manufactured’ in involuntary interaction with 
the power of the Western mass media, Western politics and Western 
military. To put it pointedly, the belief in ‘global terrorism’ springs from an 
unintended self-endangerment of modern Western society. We must stop 
seeing the world through the glasses of Al Qaida, because this, and only this, 
makes them powerful.
For all their differences, environmental, economic and terrorist global 
risks have two key features in common. First, they all promote or dictate a 
policy of proactive countermeasures that endangers liberty and annuls the 
basis of the existing forms and alliances of international politics, necessitates 
corresponding redefinitions and reforms, which call for new political 
philosophies. This means that the premises of what counts as ‘national’ and 
‘international’ and of how these dimensions should be related to and 
demarcated from each other are collapsing and must now be renegotiated 
under the banner of risk prevention in the meta-power game of global and 
national (security) policies. 
A case study of SARS: does risk empower authoritarian regimes in Asia?
’Flows’ (Appadurai), ‘actor-networks’ (Latour), ‘liquidity’ (Bauman), 
‘scapes’ (Albrow) ― these metaphors are designed to render the 
boundary-transforming and boundary-transcending processes of risk 
definition and management. Viewed in this way, world risk society is a 
process, one in which the transcending and the setting of boundaries 
intermesh and unexpected relations and interconnections arise, are enforced 
or rejected. Aihwa Ong has proposed the concept of ‘global assemblage’ 
(2004: 81) for this process. The immediate responses to the SARS virus gave 
rise to an ‘assemblage’ of institutions, governments, experts and ethics 
across borders and great geographical distances. The health experts in Asian 
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cities and global medical institutions in different parts of the world were 
included in medical measures and administrative monitoring practices. This 
produced a network of joint calculation efforts across national borders. The 
‘mobility stream’ of the SARS risk gave rise to transactive, novel and 
unexpected connections between hospitals and doctors in Hong Kong and 
other Asian cities, on the one hand, and institutions such as the World Health 
Organization and the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, on the other. 
The new diagnostic keys were developed on one side of the world and were 
tested and put into action on the other. In an interplay between technology, 
governments and monitoring agencies, ‘SARS-free’ and ‘SARS-infected’ 
areas were distinguished in which different norms of conduct and control 
were to be applied. In this way, political spaces that were otherwise sealed 
off from one another were transformed into overlapping, transnational 
zones of governance. Even the military was brought into play to an extent 
and drastic surveillance measures were implemented. Transnational 
intervention spaces arose where risk zones threatened to violate the 
prevailing safety norms. The primacy of safety was implemented strictly at 
both the local and national levels through global norms and instruments 
based on scientific expertise. 
It all began with the outbreak of the illness in China. Initially the 
authoritarian Chinese government succumbed to the impulse to tailor its 
information policy to the demands of maintaining social order by playing 
down and concealing the threat. However, such a non-information policy is 
utterly counterproductive in the case of risk networks and allocations of 
threats that cannot be delimited. The attempt to control risks by withholding 
information and covering up the spread of the threat set the emergency 
sirens blaring across the world. Because the SARS risk necessitates 
interventions by international organizations in the globalized world, in the 
end the Chinese authorities bowed to the requirements of transnational risk 
management. Only through cross-border cooperation could the necessary 
resources be mobilized also for local solutions, ranging from medical 
knowledge through strategies of containment and control up to the 
proclamation of global norms designed to stabilize trust and hence the 
markets.
Here we again encounter the law of the production of political added 
value in the global era: transnational cooperation is the precondition for 
successful national and local risk management. Not by insisting on local 
autonomy and national sovereignty but, on the contrary, only by expressly 
violating them could the sum of capabilities be mobilized that ultimately 
made it possible to find the shortest route to solutions to regional problems 
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via global detours. 
At the same time, these transnational actor-networks bring polarizations 
to light, such as the proximity of risk and exclusion and of risk and stigma 
(Hudson, 2003). Health risks mutate into threats to the national economy (job 
losses, loss of wealth, etc.), which in turn jeopardize political and civil basic 
rights, with the result that especially authoritarian states in particular are 
able to ‘overhaul’ their precarious authority and legitimacy through the 
‘struggle against risk.’ The preoccupation with security and the political 
exploitation of fear enable states to appeal to global institutions and their 
requirements to violate individual liberties without any fear of outcry or 
protest. This leads to an ‘internal globalization’ of national risk policy. Inside 
and outside, us and them, can no longer be clearly distinguished. This can go 
hand-in-hand with an authoritarian policy of renationalization, so that is not 
completely mistaken to say that cosmopolitanization and renationalization 
both hinder and complement one another (Levy and Sznaider, 2006).
Aihwa Ong analyzes this contingent mix of technology, politics and 
norms, which constitute a particular transnational milieu where health and 
administrative practices define new ways of ruling and living:
First, concerns with security and securitization have added a whole 
new dimension to state sovereignty and civil rights. On the one hand, in a 
region where economies are traditionally dependent upon global links 
and flows, authorities began to more rigidly control borders. Whereas in 
the past, the chief concern was to keep out poor migrants or terrorists, 
today the threat is any traveller with feverish bodies. Such actions have 
created political tensions between say Malaysia and Hong Kong, 
threatening to disrupt trade relations long beneficial to both countries. 
Health sovereignty seems to have overshadowed the old sovereignty of 
open economy. On the other hand, SARS has persuaded Asian 
governments to collaborate more fully with the WHO, allowing it to 
regulate the ways each country manages health treats. (...)
Second, the adoption of new infection control practices has rather 
unexpectedly given new political legitimacy to authoritarian measures 
(...) Even in Hong Kong, a special economic zone that is trying to maintain 
civil liberty against political pressures from Beijing, popular 
dissatisfaction with the ‘authoritarian’ leaders have focused on their 
initial ineffective responses to the SARS outbreak (...) The joint fears of the 
fever and continuing damage to the economy created an extremely dark 
mood, combined with an overwhelming desire for the technological 
efficacy that can secure the well-being of populations. In other words, a 
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demand for the kind of systematic bio-political regulation that is still 
incomplete in many Asian nations. There is a kind of irony in that the 
SARS-inspired debates about government in Asia countries have focused 
on the inefficiency of the authorities, their heavy-handed practices, but not 
on those authoritarian measures that curtail civil rights. Indeed, there 
seems to be surging public demands for active trust in expert systems 
becoming allied to political parties normally not tolerated in democratic 
countries or in normal times. But the SARS crisis raises the question of 
what is normal in a world of endemic, fast-spreading risks, when an 
ecological sense of security comes into play? (...) Indeed, we are in the era 
of immense risks born of technology itself ― a proliferation of cyber-and 
bio-terrors or ― errors ― that will be combated by a variety of contingent 
assemblages with diverse outcomes for modern individual, social, and 
political life (Ong, 2004: 87).
The risk of risk in a global structural claim is that we anticipate the wrong 
kind of risk. By solely focusing on potential health and financial catastrophes 
that seem to be calculable and controllable, we miss the real endangerment 
of civic liberty, which thereby is enforced.
THE “COSMOPOLITAN MOMENT” OF WORLD RISK SOCIETY
What causes the inhabitants of the world risk society an anthropological 
shock? This is no longer the metaphysical homelessness of a Beckett, the 
absent Godot, nor the nightmare visions of a Foucault, nor the mute 
despotism of rationality which frightened Max Weber. Like good old 
communism, the spectre of good old postmodernism no longer keeps people 
awake at night. What worries people nowadays is the premonition that the 
anthropological certainty of modernity is founded on quicksand. Perhaps 
SARS and BSE (Mad Cow Disease) have only been the beginning and climate 
catastrophes are becoming real. Then it is the panic-stricken fear that the 
fabric of our material dependencies and moral obligations could rend and 
the delicate functional system of world risk society collapse. 
Thus everything is turned on its head: what for Weber, Adorno and 
Foucault was a terrifying vision ― the perfected surveillance rationality of 
the administered world ― is a promise for those living in the present. It 
would be a fine thing if surveillance rationality really worked, or if we were 
only terrorized by consumption and humanism, or if the smooth operation 
of systems could be re-established by appeal to ‘autopoiesis’ or through 
‘national reforms’ and ‘technological innovation offensives.’ It would be a 
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fine thing if the liturgical chants of more market, more technologies, more 
growth and more flexibility could still provide reassurance in those 
uncertain times coming. 
As I have said, the fact that the world of the reigning certainties is in decline 
is nothing new. However, throughout history it has always been possible to 
transform the unbearableness of an alien world into a comfortable home. 
Most recently (something unknown to earlier eras) ‘national homes’ were 
created out of national flags, national hymns, national holidays and national 
heroes and places as cultural reassurance against the lost security of the 
premodern world. Whether something analogous can succeed again in the 
era of the world risk society is doubtful: dis-embedding without re-embedding ― 
that is a better description of the situation. Or could the fear of descending 
into a world of self-produced threats nevertheless be successfully 
transformed into a locally rooted openness to, and love of, the world, into 
‘cosmopolitan homes’?
What is historically new about the world risk society? Most of the 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinkers directly or indirectly advocated 
the immortalization of self-enclosed national sovereignties. Only a few 
thinkers raised serious doubts about this notion that the human race is made 
up of national islands and underlined the realities that prove the contrary: 
border-transcending interrelations, interdependencies, causalities, 
responsibility, solidarity and communities of fate. First, Immanuel Kant 
identified humanism with the respect for the dignity of difference and he 
invented the cosmopolitan right of human hospitality existing across all 
barriers and boundaries. Second, Karl Marx showed how the boundless 
dynamic of capital interconnects the apparently isolated destinies of the 
nations and individuals in conflictual ways for the most part against their 
will! Third, Friedrich Nietzsche destroyed the anthropology which held that 
humanity divides up into fixed kinds of groups whose cultures assemble 
them into religious and territorial units. His rebellion focused on the 
practitioners of the self-immortalization of bourgeois society and of 
‘bourgeois reason’ who tried to render the truth of the bourgeois theory of 
humanity and the goodness of bourgeois reality invulnerable.
However, the developing world risk society delivers the hardest blow to 
insular national thought, to political and methodological nationalism. For 
here the seemingly natural, hence divinely-ordained, connection between 
sovereignty, the right of self-determination, the nation and isolationism is 
dissolved with the dialectic of modernity itself and the mobilizing power of 
the anticipated self-destruction of all ― in other words: the “cosmopolitan 
moment” of world risk society is set free. Unilateral national policies are now 
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backward-looking idealisms, cosmopolitan cooperation is the heart of the 
new political realism. National isolationism is an illusion, a fiction, a relic ― 
it is counterproductive and condemned to failure. Even the superpower, the 
United States, was forced to recognize this recently. The autonomy of the 
state has ceased to exist among the threats to self and others of world risk 
society; it first arises out of the cooperative added value generated by the 
merging of national sovereignties. This added value of cooperation first 
enables and empowers national sovereignty to solve national problems as 
well. The world risk society could turn the national global order from its 
head onto its feet. National sovereignty does not make cooperation possible; 
rather, it is transnational cooperation that makes national sovereignty 
possible.
To conclude, let me at least pose this question on my own account: Does 
the sociologist who accords central importance to the anticipation of 
intentional terrorist attacks devotes himself to weakening the inhibitions of 
the dark imagination which feeds the activity of the terrorists? The dilemma 
of a self-critical social theory of world risk is concealed in both questions: 
Isn’t enlightenment concerning anti-modernity naïve because it prepares the 
way for the anti-moderns? Isn’t non-enlightenment concerning the 
apocalyptic visions of anti-modernity naïve because it prepares the way for 
the anti-moderns? Isn’t it this second banishment from Paradise ― this time 
from the secular Paradise of belief in the pre-established functionality and 
morality of modern capitalist society ― that undermines all previous 
sociology, and provides the inspiration for new beginnings?
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